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Zoning and Land Use Planning
Michael Lewyn*
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S PARTING SHOT
I.

Introduction

Last September, the White House issued a policy paper,
entitled “Housing Development Toolkit,” discussing barriers
to affordable housing,1 as well as a variety of policies that
might hold down housing costs. This article discusses the
Obama Administration’s paper in more detail.
II. The Problem
Since 1960, inﬂation-adjusted household incomes have
increased by only 18%, but inﬂation-adjusted rents have
increased by 49%.2 The share of renters paying more than
30% of income for rent has doubled from 24% to 49%.3 This
increase cannot be blamed on construction costs: since 1980,
construction costs have been virtually unchanged, while
housing prices have increased by over 50%.4
What went wrong? The Toolkit suggests that restrictive
zoning is at least partially to blame. For example, Los Angeles was zoned to accommodate 10 million people (four times
its population) in 1960, but today is zoned to accommodate
only 4.3 million (only slightly more than its current
population).5 The Toolkit mentions academic studies showing
similar increases in regulation in Boston, New York City and
*Associate Professor, Touro Law Center. Wesleyan University, B.A.;
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1

The White House, Housing Development Toolkit, at https://www.whi
tehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/ﬁles/images/Housing_Development_Tool
kit%20f.2.pdf (“Tookit”).
2

Id. at 7.

3

Id.

4

Id. at 5.

5

Id. at 6.
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San Francisco;6 however, it would have been more persuasive
had it responded to counterarguments that seek to blame
high housing prices on increased demand rather than
diminished supply.7
III. So What?
The most obvious negative side effect of high housing costs
is of course the rise in homelessness; while homelessness
has decreased nationwide over the past decade, it has
increased in the most costly cities.8
The Toolkit suggests, however, that housing inﬂation has
had more subtle results as well. For example, high housing
costs may increase income inequality. High rents and home
prices freeze less afﬂuent workers out of high-cost cities,
which means that workers cannot relocate to take advantage
of economic opportunities in those cities.9 The Toolkit further
suggests that this drag on mobility is a drag on national economic growth: according to one study, Gross Domestic Product would have been 10% higher in 2009 had housing costs
been lower, because fewer workers in rich, high-cost regions
mean lower output.10
Even those workers who choose to stay in high-cost regions
must sometimes live far from their job in order to ﬁnd housing that they can afford, increasing strains on mental health
and increasing greenhouse gas emissions from long
commutes.11 By contrast, if housing was less heavily regulated, urban workers would be able to live in walkable areas
near downtown, causing public transit use to rise and carinduced pollutants to decline.12
One common argument against new housing is that new
housing leads to gentriﬁcation, as afﬂuent new residents
move to new houses and apartments, increasing housing
6

Id. at 5.

7

I have addressed such arguments in these very pages. See Michael
Lewyn, Deny, Deny, Deny, 44 Real Est. L.J. 558, 564–71 (2016).
8

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 8.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 9.

12

Id. at 10.
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demand and driving up rents.13 But the Toolkit responds to
this argument by suggesting that restrictive housing in afﬂuent areas is a cause, rather than a result, of gentriﬁcation:
when new housing is kept out of the richest, most politically
powerful areas, it might ﬂood into less politically powerful
areas, which means those neighborhoods suffer any negative
results from new housing without getting the beneﬁt of lower
citywide rents.14
Another argument against new housing is that government should create more affordable housing by subsidizing
housing for the poor, rather than by allowing developers to
build housing for the rest of society. The Toolkit responds to
this argument by noting that high housing costs actually
make government subsidies less practical: the higher the
market rent, the more money it costs government to subsidize
rents.15
IV. A Toolkit of Solutions
The Toolkit suggests a variety of remedies to America’s affordability crisis, including (1) by-right development, (2) taxing vacant land, (3) streamlined permitting, (4) eliminating
minimum parking requirements, (5) allowing high-density
zoning, (6) allowing homeowners to build accessory dwelling
units, (7) establishing density bonuses for lower-income
housing, and (8) inclusionary zoning. Each of these issues
will be addressed in turn.
A. By-Right Zoning
The Toolkit claims that most “development goes through a
discretionary review process prior to approval, such as public hearings or local legislative actions.”16 As an alternative,
the Toolkit endorses “by-right development [which] allows
13

See, e.g., Sarina Triangle, City Council Fears Broken Promises,
Gentriﬁcation with De Blasio’s Rezoning Plan, at http://cityandstateny.co
m/articles/politics/new-york-city/city-council-fears-broken-promises,-gentri
ﬁcation-with-de-blasios-rezoning-plan.html#.WDdMVNIrLIU.
14

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 9.

15

Id. at 10.

16

Id. at 14.
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projects to be approved administratively when proposals
meet local zoning requirements.”17
The Toolkit’s description of the status quo is unnecessarily
imprecise. It is true that in at least one high-cost city (San
Francisco), all development is subject to discretionary
review.18 However, it is more common for zoning ordinances
to allow “by-right” development for development conforming
to existing zoning, but to include so many regulations that
most large-scale development will rarely conform to every
rule, which in turn means that developers must often request
a rezoning.19 For example, New York City does allow as-ofright development when such development complies with
the zoning code.20 But because the city has so many different
types of zones,21 such development proposals often will not
comply since presumably there are SOME cases where a
proposal does comply with existing zoning. Nevertheless, the
Toolkit’s broader argument makes sense: if cities had simpler
zoning codes and fewer permit applications required a rezoning, development would be simpler and more housing would
be built.
B. Vacant Land
Since 2000, the number of vacant residential units has
increased from 7 million to 10 million.22 The Toolkit points
out that vacant lots harm surrounding neighborhoods and
17

Id.

18

See Michael Lewyn, The Roots of Expensive Zoning, 45 Real Est.
L.J. 256, 263–64 (2016).
19

See Noah M. Kazis, Public Actors, Private Law: Local Government’s
Use of Covenants to Regulate Land Use, 124 Yale L.J. 1790, 1802–03 (2015)
(although “discretionary, negotiated review of land use proposals is
increasingly common . . . [m]ore commonly, municipalities simply impose
extremely restrictive zoning rules governing what may be built as-of-right,
without discretionary action by the government, and wait for developers
to seek variances, rezonings, or other forms of discretionary relief.”).
20

See NYC Planning, Zoning Process, at http://www1.nyc.gov/site/plan
ning/zoning/zoning-process.page.
21

See NYC Planning, Residence Districts: Overview at https://www1.n
yc.gov/site/planning/zoning/districts-tools/residence-districts-r1-r10.page
(zoning code designates ten basic types of districts for housing alone, as
well as numerous subdistricts within those categories).
22

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 15.
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“represent lost housing opportunities.”23 The Toolkit also
discusses remedies for the harm caused by vacant lots, noting that many cities impose special fees upon the owners of
vacant lots, while Dallas acquires vacant lots and sells them
to nonproﬁt groups, which then build housing on these lots.24
These ideas do not seem particularly controversial;
however, I am not sure how closely related they are to the
scourge of high rents. As a matter of common sense, it seems
to me that a landowner is most likely to leave a lot vacant
when it cannot sell the land for very much- a problem more
common, I suspect, in low-cost cities than in expensive cities
such as New York or San Francisco.
C. The Permit Process
The Toolkit quite properly points out that “lengthy permitting processes restrict long-run housing supply.”25 It notes
that some cities and states have sought to expedite
permitting. For example, Austin expedites permit review for
developers of low-income housing, and Massachusetts has
suggested model permit practices for localities.26 These practices seem noncontroversial; however, I wish that the Toolkit
had explained the obstacles to speedy permits- that is, why
cities often fail to make speedy permit decisions, and why
remedies to this problem might be controversial.
D. Minimum Parking Requirements
As automobiles became more common, municipalities
began to require commercial landowners to provide off-street
parking for tenants and visitors. In 1946, only 17% of cities
had enacted such regulations- but by 1951, 71% of cities had
done so.27 Today, such minimum parking requirements are
virtually universal.28
These regulations make housing more expensive; parking
may cost between $5,000 per space (for a surface parking
lot) and $60,000 (for an underground space)-costs that may
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 16.

27

See Donald C. Shoup, The High Cost of Free Parking 22 (2005).

28

Id. at 25.
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be passed on to renters.29 The Toolkit cites a study in Seattle
ﬁnding that parking requirements increase rental costs by
50%.30 The Toolkit points out that these costs are especially
punitive for lower-income households, because these families
tend to own fewer vehicles, and thus do not beneﬁt as much
from government-mandated parking.31
The Toolkit also gives examples of cities that have fought
to make these requirements less burdensome: it notes, for
example, that Seattle has eliminated minimum parking
requirements in center-city areas with the most frequent
transit service, Denver has reduced parking quotas for lowincome housing, and Minneapolis has reduced parking
requirements for areas near transit stops.32 California has
overridden local zoning codes to reduce parking requirements
for low-income housing near public transit.33
Although the Toolkit’s analysis seems persuasive, it leaves
open one key question: if minimum parking requirements
increase housing costs, why not abolish them everywhere?
However, a more detailed analysis would have required the
Toolkit to respond to the arguments for such requirements.34
E. Density
The Toolkit suggests “zoning code changes that allow for
the development of higher-density and multifamily
housing.”35 This is certainly a worthy reform, because building more residences on an acre of land increases overall
regional housing supply, thus lowering housing prices.
However, the Toolkit does not explain how much deregulation is appropriate, nor does it explain what (if anything)
29

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 16.

30

Id. at 17.

31

Id. at 16.

32

Id. at 17.

33

Id. See also Melanie Curry, Governor Signs Bill to Reduce Parking
Requirements Near Affordable Housing, at http://cal.streetsblog.org/2015/
10/12/governor-brown-signs-bill-loosening-parking-requirements-for-afford
able-housing/.
34

I have addressed this issue in more detail at Michael Lewyn, What
Would Coase Do? (About Parking Regulation), 22 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev.
89 (2010).
35

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 17.
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state governments should do if local governments fail to follow its advice. Perhaps the Toolkit’s authors thought that
such advice is unnecessary, and that cities might be motivated to follow its advice based on the clarity of its reasoning.
But local politicians have strong incentives to oppose new
housing. To the extent that new housing succeeds in holding
down rents and housing costs, it makes the property of existing homeowners less valuable; thus, local governments
elected by those homeowners have a strong incentive to
constrict housing supply. And even if a region’s citizens agree
in principle that more housing is necessary, they may wish
that housing to be built in other neighborhoods or municipalities, causing housing to be built only in a few neighborhoods
with limited political power. In addition, the Toolkit does not
instruct policymakers how to respond to the most common
objections to new housing.36
F. Accessory Dwelling Units
One way of adding new housing to a neighborhood is by
allowing accessory dwelling units (ADUs)—that is, selfcontained units located on the property of single-family
homes.37 The Toolkit endorses ADUs, because they increase
citywide housing supply and allow young adults to live near
their parents (or seniors to live near their children) while
retaining some independence.38 It adds that some cities have
encouraged ADUs, and that the state of California has
streamlined unspeciﬁed state regulations to promote ADU
construction.39 However, the Toolkit does not discuss possible
objections to ADUs,40 how policymakers should respond to
those objections, or whether states should preempt antiADU local regulations.
G. Density Bonuses and Affordable Housing
In addition to endorsing increases in overall housing sup36

Cf. Michael Lewyn, Against the Neighborhood Veto, 44 Real Est.
L.J. 82, 86–96 (2015) (discussing, and responding to, major objections to
new housing).
37

See John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory
Challenges for Micro-Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 Stan. L. &
Policy Rev. 53, 54 (2014).
38

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 17.

39

Id.

40

See Infranca, supra note 37, at 66.
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ply, the Toolkit endorses policies focused on “affordable housing” (that is, housing affordable to lower-income persons).41
One such policy is density bonuses- that is, “granting projects in which the developer includes a certain number of affordable housing units the ability to construct a greater
number of market rate units than would otherwise be
allowed.”42
At ﬁrst glance, these policies may seem noncontroversial,
because they allow a developer to increase both the lowerincome housing supply and the market-rate housing supply.
But density bonuses might create some long-term risks.
First, a community that strongly desires lower-income housing may set artiﬁcially low density caps in order to encourage developers to build such housing. Second, the existence
of density bonuses encourages affordable housing advocates
to favor strict density regulation, because the stricter the
regulations, the more incentive developers have to build
lower-income housing to avoid those regulations. Thus, a
policy of regulation combined with density bonuses is a lessthan-ideal solution: it leads to more housing construction
than regulation alone, but might nevertheless lead to less
housing construction than more aggressive deregulation.
H. Inclusionary Zoning
Similarly, the Toolkit suggests “inclusionary zoning” in order to promote affordable housing. Inclusionary zoning
“require[s] or incentivize developers to build below-marketrate homes . . . as part of the process of developing marketrate housing developments.” 43 Such policies have been
implemented in nearly 500 local jurisdictions44 and have
41

See The Economic Times, Affordable Housing, at http://economictim
es.indiatimes.com/deﬁnition/affordable-housing (deﬁning term as housing
“affordable by that segment of society whose income is below the median
household income”).
42

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 17.

43

Lisa A. Sturdevant, Separating Fact From Fiction to Design Effective Inclusionary Zoning Programs 1, at http://media.wix.com/ugd/19cfbe_
9a68f933ed6c45bfb5f8b7d2ef49dda0.pdf.
44

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 18.
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produced between 129,000 and 150,000 affordable housing
units nationwide.45
In theory, inclusionary zoning might reduce the overall
housing supply, because a developer might lose revenue by
building lower-priced affordable units and make up for that
loss by either by building fewer overall units, or by raising
rents and prices for market-rate units. Relevant scholarship
is divided on whether this has in fact occurred.46
Some studies suggest that inclusionary zoning is most effective where it avoids this problem by allowing developers
to offset the costs of affordable housing in some way- for
example, through the sort of density bonuses discussed
above47 or through tax incentives. For example, the Toolkit
endorses Seattle’s program creating tax exemptions on new
multifamily buildings that set aside 20–25% of their units
for affordable housing.48 Such tax subsidies are likely to be
politically popular, but of course may cost cities tax revenue.
V.

Conclusion
The Toolkit certainly points state and local governments
in the right direction, by discussing the harmful results of
zoning codes that limit housing supply and by suggesting a
variety of reforms.
However, the Toolkit could have been more useful had it
been a little more detailed. In particular, the Toolkit could
have addressed the boundaries of state and local
policymaking: if each locality’s citizens prefer that housing
be built in another neighborhood or locality, nothing will get
built. So how aggressive should a state be in encouraging
municipalities to do what is good for the city or region as a
whole? In addition, the Toolkit criticizes a variety of regulations, but fails to address the counterarguments justifying
those regulations. Because the Toolkit fails to give policymakers the intellectual ammunition they need to defend deregulation, it is to some extent a missed opportunity.
45

See Sturdevant, supra note 43, at 2.

46

Id. at 7 (admitting that some studies have found such results, but
asserting that more rigorous studies disagree).
47

Id. at 9.

48

See Toolkit, supra note 1, at 18. The Toolkit also mentions Philadelphia’s policy of tax abatements for new residential housing generally. Id.
at 19.
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